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Focusing on private equity firms, I find that targets receive a higher premium when 
acquirers are private firms. When the target management is in the private acquirer’s team, 
the targets receive a lower premium. When I look at cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), 
targets of private acquirers have lower CARs than those of public acquirers, and private 
acquisitions with management participation have higher CARs than without management 
participation. Also, private acquisitions are more likely to be successful than public 
acquisitions, and within private acquisitions, those with target’s management participation 
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1. Introduction  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is one of the most researched areas in finance. Until 
now, many papers have investigated the impact that M&A has on firms from either the 
acquirer’s or target’s perspective, but not many have paid attention to the deals where the 
acquirers are private equity firms. Private firms behave differently from public firms in 
many ways, and so their M&A decision making is influenced by different motivations and 
goals. 
This paper examines mergers and acquisitions where the primary acquirers are private 
equity firms. Some of these acquirers have teamed up with the management of target firms 
to take these firms private. The biggest criticism leveled against these acquisitions is that 
the private acquirers are teaming up with target management to exploit target shareholders. 
In this study, I examine whether the target premiums and target valuations in these 
acquisitions are lower than those in comparable public acquisitions. A closely related 
academic study is by Bargeron et al. (2007). They examine the targets’ returns and 
premiums and find that they are lower when the acquirer is a private firm. They also find 
that there is no difference in the premiums paid by private acquirers and public acquirers 
with high managerial ownership.    
This study differs from the above study in several ways. First, my focus is on the 
valuation of the target firm, whereas Bargeron et al. (2007) mainly focus on the three-day 
announcement period returns. Second, my study includes private acquisitions where the 
target management is part of the buyout team. The Bargeron study uses management 
ownership of the acquirer and finds no difference between the acquisitions made by public 
and private acquirers when the acquirers have high managerial ownership, especially when 
2 
 
it is more than 20%.  In contrast, I study the deals where the managers of target firms are 
involved in the buyout.     
The main findings of this paper are as follows. First, public targets receive higher 
premiums when acquirers are private firms. Second, for private acquisitions, when the 
target management is in the acquirer’s team, the targets receive a lower premium. However, 
despite receiving the higher premiums, targets of private acquirers have lower cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) than do targets of public acquirers. And private acquisitions with 
management participation have higher CARs than those without management participation. 
I also study the effects of firm and deal characteristics on the outcome of an acquisition 
bid. I find that private acquisitions are more likely to succeed than public acquisitions, and 
within private acquisitions, those with target’s management participation have even better 
odds.  
 
2. Literature review 
Since mergers and acquisitions continue to be a popular corporate strategy, many 
academic studies have paid attention to this area. Dodd and Ruback (1977) estimate the 
stock market reaction to tender offers. Their results show that only successful bidders have 
positive abnormal returns, whereas targets always have positive abnormal returns. Most of 
the papers that investigate M&A have focused on public acquirers and targets. Capron and 
Pistre (2002) find that acquirers do not have positive abnormal returns when they receive 
resources from target firms, but when they transfer their own resources to the target, a 
positive abnormal return generally occurs. Trillas (2002) analyzed M&A in the European 
market and finds that the average effect on acquirers’ shareholder value is not significantly 
different from zero, which is consistent with the finding of previous studies that acquiring 
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firm’s shareholders do not benefit from takeovers. On the other hand, many previous 
studies show that target firm’s shareholders benefit from acquisitions. Huang and Walking 
(1987) study the effects of managerial reaction, payment method, and type of acquisition 
on the target firm’s abnormal returns.  Healy et al. (1992) examine 50 largest U.S. mergers 
between 1979 and 1984 and find that merged firms’ asset productivity significantly 
improved, which led to increasing returns.  
Since the beginning of the 21th century, many private firms have been participating in 
M&A and have drawn much attention from analysts and investors. Although the growing 
role of private acquirers has become an important aspect of the M&A market, not many 
papers have studied these acquirers. Also, there are not many papers that investigate private 
targets. Fuller et al. (2002) study shareholder returns of firms that acquired five or more 
targets, which includes private and subsidiary targets, and show that acquirers benefit from 
acquiring private firms or subsidiaries. Faccio (2006) investigates the acquirers’ 
announcement period abnormal returns in 17 European countries and finds that acquirers 
of unlisted targets experience positive abnormal returns, but acquirers of listed targets 
experience negative abnormal returns. Capron and Shen (2007) study the selection of 
private and public targets and find that acquirers tend to choose private targets in similar 
industries, and they perform better than those acquirers that choose public targets. Officer 
et al. (2009) show that acquirer’s returns are significantly higher if targets are hard to value 
(due to information asymmetry) and the acquirer’s stock is used to pay for the acquisition.  
Not many papers have focused on private acquirers. Bargeron et al. (2007) examine the 
target’s returns and premiums and find that they are significantly lower when the acquirer 
is a private firm. The difference in premiums is not much when acquisitions by private 
acquirers are compared with public acquirers who have high managerial ownership. Brown 
4 
 
and Maloney (1999) show the relationship between board composition and acquisition 
returns and find that smaller boards help in better acquisition performance.  
I want to study acquisitions where the acquirer is a private firm. My study contributes 
to the literature on private acquisitions by studying a special set of these acquisitions where 
the target’s management is part of the acquisition team.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
Private acquirers behave differently from public acquirers in many ways, and my study 
focuses on these important players in M&A transactions. In my study, I want to know how 
differences in firm and deal characteristics influence the target’s gains. My first hypothesis 
is that the private acquirers are able to buy firms at a discount compared to public acquirers.  
One reason could be that private acquirers prefer to buy distressed firms and turn them 
around to make money, and distressed firms usually have less bargaining power. Previous 
studies have not focused much on private acquisitions where the target’s management is 
part of the acquisition team. A goal of my study is to fill this gap. My second hypothesis is 
that when a target’s management works with a private acquirer and helps in acquiring the 
firm it works for, the target firm receives an even lower premium. One explanation is that 
the target’s management has vested interest in helping negotiate a deal that favors the 
acquirers. Since the target’s management is part of the acquisition team, they could be 
compensated in many different ways after the acquisition is completed.   
My two hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 




Hypothesis 2  
Targets acquired by private firms with the help of target’s management receive lower 
premiums than targets in regular private acquisitions.  
 
4. Data 
The data on acquisitions was obtained from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. 
Merger and Acquisition Database. All transactions between 1990 and 2016 were 
considered for inclusion in our sample. Stock price data was obtained from CRSP and the 
accounting and company characteristic data from Compustat. Table 1 reports the 
distribution across years of U.S. completed private and public acquisitions during the 
period 1990-2016. From this table we can see that the number of M&A transactions has a 
decreasing trend after 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter referred to as SOX) 
was passed by the U.S. congress in 2002 after a series of corporate frauds, and it set new 
requirements in governance, accounting, auditing, and reporting of U.S. public firms. It is 
not surprising that after the enactment of the SOX act in 2002, it has cost firms substantially 
to comply with the provisions of the act. The auditing and other fees relating to the act are 
a heavy burden for publicly traded companies, especially smaller firms, which influences 
their financial decision making (Ghosh et. al (2009)).  Bova et al. (2014) state that SOX 
may influence the decisions of private firms to go public via acquisition. Therefore, this 
act may be one of the reasons for the decreasing trend of mergers and acquisitions in the 
last fifteen years. 
In my final sample, I have included all the acquisitions that took place in the period 
1990-2016 that satisfied the following criteria: 
(1) The acquirer is a U.S. domestic firm; the target is a U.S. domestic firm.  
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(2) For the main sample of private acquisitions, the acquirer is a private equity firm. For 
the control sample, the acquirer is a public firm.  
(3) Only the first transaction of any firm in a given year is included. 
(4) The target’s CUSIP must match CUSIP in Compustat and CRSP databases. 
The company characteristics data was collected from Compustat database. The target’s 
stock price data was obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
database. Information regarding whether the target management is a part of the acquisition 
team was obtained from SDC. I also checked Factiva database in order to verify that the 
management participation item in SDC is accurate. My final sample includes 1,449 private 
acquisitions and 2,690 public acquisitions. For the 1,449 private acquisitions, 1,362 of them 
are without management participation and 87 with management participation. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of my final sample. I provide the mean and 
median for each variable, and I also do the t-test and Wilcoxon signed- rank test to test 
significant differences of means and medians of public and private acquisitions, and also 
of private acquisitions with management participation and private acquisitions without 
management participation. For the differences between public and private acquisitions, I 
find that both the mean and median test results are significant and positive for all variables 
except for leverage, which is significant and negative. The results show that public firms 
prefer to acquire bigger firms. From firm characteristics such as EPS, FCF and leverage, 
we see that that private firms are more likely to buy distressed firms. They buy companies 
that are in a difficult situation, turn them around, and sell them off for a profit. 
From the differences between private acquisitions without management participation 
and private acquisitions with management participation, we see that the difference in means 
of EPS is -0.3147. When the target management is part of the acquisition team, private 
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firms prefer to acquire firms that are in a relatively better financial condition. One reason 
for this could be that acquirers of profitable target firms are more likely to retain the 
existing management (which is part of the acquisition team), and this protects the interests 
of the target’s managers. The difference in targets’ Tobin’s Q is 0.5472, which is 
significantly positive. This shows that with target managers’ participation in the acquisition, 
the acquirers have more information about the target and are more likely to buy targets that 
are undervalued. Table 3 gives the correlation matrix for variables shown in Table 2. 
 
5. Methodology 
Now I explain how I test my two hypotheses stated above. 
5.1. Examine the premiums paid to targets 
Using the methodology in Moeller et al. (2002), I calculate the acquisition premium as 
the transaction value divided by target’s market value 4 weeks before announcement date 
times the percentage of shares acquired. The acquisition premiums are shown in Table 4. I 
also attempted to get premiums from SDC. SDC provides the values of different 
components of the offer (cash, stock, and other securities) and the initial and terminal offer 
price. However, this has been the subject of criticism in Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2002) that there is too much missing data, and so it can’t be used to conduct research. 
In Table 5, I use the comparable transactions method in Kaplan and Ruback (1995) to 
compute the differences between the acquisition multiples of private targets without and 
with management participation. In order to find the comparable transactions for 1362 
private acquisitions without management participation and 87 private acquisitions with 
management participation, I set the following criteria: 
(1) The comparable transaction should be in the same industry (Fama French 12-industry)  
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(2) The comparable transaction should happen in the same year. 
(3) The target market value of the comparable transaction should be within the range of 
30 percent. 
5.2. Event study  
In my study, I estimate thirty-day cumulative abnormal returns for targets using the 
market model.  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Rit = return on stock i in period t 
Rmt = return on CRSP equally weighted index in period t 
The effect of SOX cannot be ignored in my study, and so I divide my sample into two parts 
according to the announcement date, one before SOX and the other after SOX. I do the 
event study separately for these two subsamples.   
5.3. Regression Analysis 
5.3.1. Regression Analysis of Premiums Offered 
I use multivariate regression analysis to control for different variables and see if my 
univariate analysis results hold up in the presence of these control variables. I estimate the 
regression coefficients in three different models and construct three subsamples for their 
estimation. The first subsample includes 3,719 completed public and private acquisitions 
excluding private acquisitions with management participation. The second subsample 
includes all 1,449 completed private acquisitions. And the third subsample includes 2,489 
completed public and private acquisitions excluding private acquisitions without 




In the regressions, the dependent variable is acquisition premium, whose summary 
values are shown in Table 4. The acquisition premium is calculated using transaction value 
divided by target’s market value four weeks before acquisition times the percentage of 
outstanding shares acquired.  
Independent Variables: 
Mgmt:  Mgmt is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the target's management is 
part of the acquisition team and equal to zero otherwise. 
Private: Private is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the acquirer is a private firm 
and equal to zero otherwise. Previous research has shown that private firms are different 
from public firms in many different ways. I want to know how the difference between 
private and public firms influences the premium paid to targets. 
The control variables can be separated into two classes, firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics. 
Firm characteristics include:  
Tobin: It denotes Tobin’s Q and reflects growth opportunities. It can also indicate if a 
company is undervalued or overvalued. Servaes (1991) investigates the relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and the gains from takeovers. He finds that Tobin’s Q and the 
cumulative abnormal returns are negatively correlated. 
Leverage: It denotes the leverage ratio and is calculated as the total long-term debt divided 
by the total equity of the firm. Private firms prefer to acquire targets with high leverage. 
Highly levered companies have a weaker bargaining power in the takeover (Bargeron et. 
al (2008)), and so the target shareholders benefit less from private acquirers.  
Logmv: It denotes the logarithm of a firm’s market value and is used to measure the size of 
the company. The market value is calculated as the stock price times the number of shares 
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outstanding. Moeller et al. (2002) show in a sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public firms 
that M&A returns are higher for smaller acquirers. They show that there is a size effect in 
mergers and acquisitions. Officer (2003) show that when the target’s firm size is larger, 
their shareholders get lower premium.   
Deal characteristics include: 
Cash: It is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the method of payment for the 
acquisition is all-cash and equal to zero otherwise. Because private firms do not have 
publicly traded equity, most of their deals are cash only. It is not surprising that this variable 
influences my regression results. Huang and Walking (1987) show that cash offers usually 
come with high abnormal returns.  
Toehold: It is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when the acquirer holds at least 5% of 
the target shares prior to acquisition and equal to zero otherwise. Previous studies show the 
influence of toehold on M&A activities. Betton and Eckbo (2000) found that acquirers with 
toeholds offer lower premiums in winning bids. Betton et. al (2009) state that toehold can 
help increase the probability of successfully acquiring of targets. 
Tender offer: A tender offer is a public, open offer by a company to buy its current 
shareholders’ shares. The investors offer a specific price which is often above the 
company’s current stock price. Previous studies show that tender offer is often associated 
with higher premiums.  
Hostile: Hostility is usually perceived when an offer is made public and is aggressively 
rejected by the target firm. Hostile takeovers are often harmful to at least some of the 
stakeholders in the target firms. In contrast, friendly takeovers are often seen to create 
synergies that benefit both the acquirer and the target firms. 
Appendix A gives a description of all the variables used in this regression. 
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5.3.2. Regression Analysis of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns  
For the regressions on CAR, my sample includes all the completed public and private   
acquisitions. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return. I choose three 
different event windows (-1, +1), (-30, -2), (+2, +30) and use the CAR in each event 
window as the dependent variable. I regress the CARs in these event windows on various 
independent variables using two different models.  In the first model, I would like to find 
out how the type of acquirer (public vs private) and the target management’s participation 
in the acquisition (in both public and private acquisitions) influence the CARs. I also 
consider the effect of SOX on the CARs.  In the second model, I would like to find out 
how within private acquisitions the target management’s participation in the acquisition 
influences CARs. The independent variables are given below. In the first regression model, 
the independent variables are: 
mgmt: It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the management of the target is part of 
the acquisition team and equal to zero otherwise, irrespective of whether the acquirer is a 
public or a private firm.  
sox_mgmt: It is an interaction variable between the mgmt variable and whether the 
acquisition took place after the passing of SOX on July 30, 2002. 
pvnomgmt: It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the acquisition is by a private firm 
without the help of the target’s management.  
sox_pvnomgmt: It is an interaction variable between pvnomgmt variable and SOX. 
The other variables in this regression have already been explained above. 




pvandmgmt: It is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when the acquisition is by a private 
firm with the help of the target’s management and equal to zero for other private 
acquisitions.  
sox_pvandmgmt: It is an interaction variable between pvandmgmt and SOX.  
5.3.3. Logistical Analysis of Deal Status 
I run three more regressions to find the effect of different variables on the likely success 
of an acquisition bid. The dependent variable is deal status, a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 when the deal is complete and equal to zero otherwise. In the first regression, the 
sample consists of all complete and incomplete private acquisitions from 1990 to 2016. In 
the second regression, all 21,561 complete and incomplete deals are included in my sample. 
In the third regression, I choose all private and public acquisitions with management 
participation as my sample and add a new independent variable ‘Number of Bidders’ to 
my regression.  
6. Results 
6.1. Acquisition premiums  
   In table 4, I report the acquisition premiums. We see that the targets of public acquiring 
firms receive lower acquisition premiums than targets of private acquiring firms. This 
result does not seem to support our first hypothesis. To get conclusive evidence, we have 
to control for other variables that influence premiums and then test the effect of the type of 
the acquiring firm (public vs private) on acquisition premiums. I test this in the section 
relating to multivariate analysis. At this stage of our analysis, a possible explanation of 
why the premiums paid by private firms are higher than those paid by public firms is that 
private firms, as we have seen in Table 2, tend to acquire more distressed firms than public 
firms do. These targets have low stock price and are possibly undervalued. Given how I 
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calculate acquisition premiums as the ratio of the transaction value divided by target market 
value 4 weeks before announcement date times the percentage of shares acquired, the 
smaller denominator in the ratio tends to raise the acquisition premium. 
   We also see from Table 4 that targets of private firms with the target’s management 
participation in the acquisition team receive lower premiums than targets of private firms 
without management participation. In fact, this premium is also lower than the premium 
received by the targets of public firms. This result seems to be consistent with our second 
hypothesis.  A possible explanation for this result is that the target’s managers take actions 
to help reduce the premium paid for their own interest. However, for conclusive evidence, 
we have to wait for the results of multivariate analysis. 
6.2. Event Study  
   The results of the event study are shown in Table 6. In the event window (-1, +1), and all 
other event windows too, the CAR for public acquisitions is more than that for private 
acquisitions with no management participation. This is despite the higher premiums paid 
by private acquirers with no target management participation. An explanation for this could 
be that private firms buyout companies that are in worse financial condition than public 
firms, as seen in Table 2. Though private firms seem to have faith in their acquisitions and 
believe that the acquired companies can be turned around, the market does not seem to 
share this optimism to the extent of the private acquirers.  
   The CAR in the event window (-1, +1), and in most event windows, is higher for private 
acquisitions with management participation than for private acquisitions without 
management participation. From the results in Table 4, we saw that private acquirers with 
management participation paid lower premiums than private acquirers with management 
participation. Yet, we see that the CAR is higher for the former than the latter. A reason 
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for this could be that the management of the target is on the acquisition team when the 
acquired company is good and can do better after the acquisition or is currently in a bad 
condition but has good chances of being turned around. If the market shares this view, then 
though lower premiums are paid by private acquirers with management participation, we 
should expect to see higher CARs for their targets.   
   Comparing the results of event study before and after SOX, we notice that the difference 
is significant. In general, the abnormal returns for the event window (-30, -2) are less after 
SOX than before SOX. The abnormal returns for (-1, +1) window are higher after SOX 
than before SOX. This shows that there is less leakage of information before the 
announcement date after the enactment of SOX in 2002. After SOX, most of the action 
happens around the announcement date, (-1, +1) window.  
6.3. Regressions Analysis 
6.3.1. Regressions on premiums 
   Panel A of Table 7 shows the correlation matrix of independent variables. In Panel B, we 
see that the independent variable private in the first regression is positively related to 
premium. This result supports the univariate result in Table 4 where we saw that private 
acquirers tend to pay higher premiums than public acquirers. The probable reason given 
earlier for this seems more convincing in light of this multivariate result. I reasoned that 
private acquirers tend to buy more distressed firms than public firms do. These targets have 
low stock price and are possibly undervalued. Given how I calculate acquisition premiums 
as the ratio of the transaction value divided by target market value 4 weeks before 
announcement date times the percentage of shares acquired, the smaller denominator in the 
ratio tends to raise the acquisition premium. This result does not support my first hypothesis. 
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   In the second regression, the estimated coefficient for mgmt. is -0.3399, which is negative 
and significantly related to acquisition premium. It indicates that when there is 
management participation, targets receive lower premium. This result is consistent with the 
univariate result in Table 4. Now we have conclusive evidence that having the target’s 
management on the acquisition team helps in negotiating a lower premium. The target’s 
management may be willing to do so in return for some compensation or a promise for a 
better future in the acquired company. This result supports our second hypothesis. 
   For all the three regressions, the coefficients of Tobin’s Q, toehold, market value, and 
cash are all negative. The results for Tobin’s Q are consistent with previous academic 
studies. When the acquirer holds more than 5% of the target shares prior to acquisition, the 
premium paid to targets is lower, which is consistent with previous research. Furthermore, 
the tender offer is positively and significantly related to premium.  
6.3.2. Regressions on CAR 
   As explained earlier, I regress the CARs in three event windows on various variables 
using two different models.  The results are shown in Table 8. The p-values of the 
independent variables in the regressions for the event windows (-30, -2) and (+2, +30) are 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, I will discuss the results only for the event window (-
1, +1). From the first model, we see that the influence of target management’s participation 
in all kinds of acquisitions (public and private) on CAR is statistically insignificant before 
SOX but is very significant after SOX. A more dramatic change occurs when we compare 
the results of pvnomgt variable before and after SOX. Before SOX, the type of acquirer 
has a strong influence on CARs. In particular, if the acquisition is by a private acquirer, it 
has a strong negative influence on CARs. This is consistent with my univariate results. As 
reasoned earlier, this may be because of the fact that private firms tend to acquire 
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companies that are in distress, and the market has not much faith that these targets can be 
turned around. The very act of acquiring these targets may be reinforcing the beliefs of the 
investors leading to negative CARs. However, after SOX we see a dramatic change in the 
influence of this variable, sox_pvnomgt. From being a strong negative influencer of CARs, 
it changes to become a strong positive influencer of CARs. Though the provisions of SOX 
are meant primarily for public companies, it looks like SOX has made private companies 
become very careful in the type of acquisitions they make. Complying with the provisions 
of SOX is costly enough, and acquiring companies that are in bad shape may put the 
acquirers, especially private acquirers, in a very difficult situation. It looks like that after 
SOX, private acquirers have been targeting companies that have a realistic chance of being 
turned around. Therefore, we see that the CARs associated with private acquirers changed 
from being negative to positive. From the second regression, we see a similar kind of 
change for the influence of management participation in private acquisitions. All these 
results point to the fact that companies have become more careful in the acquisitions they 
make after SOX. This point of view is supported by the observation that the number of 
acquisitions per year has been going down after SOX. As a result, when companies are 
being acquired, the investors seem to believe that these targets are being acquired after a 
lot of thought and scrutiny and therefore have a realistic chance of being turned around. 
Hence, the CARs of targets have been positive on announcement of acquisitions after SOX. 
6.3.3. Regressions on deal status 
   The results of the regressions on deal status are shown in Table 9. For the first regression, 
the sample consists of all complete and incomplete private acquisitions from 1990 to 2016, 
and the estimated coefficient for mgmt is - 0.132, which is significantly negative. This 
indicates that the M&A deals are less likely to succeed when there is management 
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participation. For the second regression, all 21,561 complete and incomplete deals are 
included in my sample. The results show that private bidders have higher probability to 
conduct a successful M&A deal. The coefficient for private is 0.107 and is significant at 
1% level. For the third regression, I choose all private and public acquisitions with 
management participation as my sample and add a new independent variable ‘Number of 
Bidders’ to my regression. The parameter for the new variable ‘Number of Bidders’ is 
negative (-0.184), which is significant at 5% level. When there is more than one bidder, 
the likelihood of the acquisition being completed goes down.  In all the three regressions, 
the estimated coefficient for toehold is significantly positive. The acquirers with toehold 
are more likely to succeed, which is consistent with Betton et. al (2009). Except for the 
third regression, the coefficients for hostile are significantly negative. In this case, if the 
target company’s management does not want the deal to go through, they will take actions 
to prevent it from happening, and the acquisition attempt is less likely to succeed. 
 
7. Conclusion 
   In this paper, I focus on private acquiring firms. Using different methods, I want to find 
out which kind of acquirers benefit target shareholders more, public acquirers or private 
acquirers. Furthermore, I test the effect the target’s management participation has on the 
gains of the target’s shareholders. Overall, my results can be explained from two 
perspectives. From one perspective, when I use premium as the measuring standard, my 
results show that private acquirers pay higher premium than public acquirers, and private 
acquirers with target’s management participation pay lower premiums than private 
acquirers without management participation. From another perspective, when I use CARs 
as the measuring criteria, the results are slightly different. Targets of public acquirers 
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experience higher returns than targets of private acquirers. Of the private acquirers, those 
with target management participation experience higher returns than those without target 
management participation. Why are the results different when I use different measure of 
shareholders’ gains? One possible explanation is that CARs include more information than 
just premiums. It reflects not only the premiums, but also what the market thinks about the 
deal. For example, even though private acquirers pay higher premiums than public 
acquirers, the CARs associated with the former are lower. This could be because the market 
does not have much faith in the acquisitions by private firms.  Regarding which acquisition 
deals are more likely to succeed, I find that private acquisitions as a whole are more likely 
to succeed than public acquisitions. Among private acquisitions, those with target’s 
management participation have a lower probability of succeeding than those without 
target’s management participation. This is probably because when there is target’s 
management participation, investors are less likely to trust the deal, which leads to a lower 
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Transaction premium is calculated using transaction value divided by 
targets market value four weeks before acquisition times shares 
acquired.  
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal return for three different event windows (-1, 
+1), (-30, -2), (+2, +30). 
Deal status  




A dummy variable equals to one if the acquirer includes target’s 
management participation 
Private  A dummy variable equals to one if the acquirer is a private company 
Pvnomgmt 
A dummy variable equals to one if the acquirer is a private company 
and without target management participation 
Pvwithmgmt 
A dummy variable equals to one if the acquirer is a private company 
and with target management participation 
Tobin 
Tobin's Q ratio = total market value of firm / total asset value of firm 
Total market value is calculated using stock price per share times 
number of shares outstanding. 
Leverage Leverage ratio = total long-term debt / total equity 
Logmv Logarithm of target market value,  
Cash  
A dummy variable equals to one if there is all-cash payment to target 
shareholders 
Toehold 
A dummy variable equals to one if the acquirer holds at least 5% of 
the target shares prior to acquisition 
Tender A dummy variable equals to one if the deal is tender offer 
Hostile 
A dummy variable equals to one if the deal is hostile, as opposed to 
friendly/neutral. 
SOX 
A dummy variable equals to 1 when the deal happened after SOX 






Table 1 Distribution of Acquisitions by Calendar Year 
Sample distribution across years of U.S. completed private and public acquisitions 
during the period 1990—2016. The sample is taken from the Securities Data 








Public targets and 
Public Bidders 
1990 323 21 9 524 
1991 291 21 5 459 
1992 282 24 7 454 
1993 306 21 9 526 
1994 490 23 9 743 
1995 591 19 3 758 
1996 683 25 12 895 
1997 419 22 15 837 
1998 328 23 13 904 
1999 288 29 20 802 
2000 241 29 24 739 
2001 174 21 19 491 
2002 189 18 15 330 
2003 174 25 20 340 
2004 114 8 4 326 
2005 166 5 1 335 
2006 156 19 8 344 
2007 187 4 4 380 
2008 155 4 0 287 
2009 229 1 1 224 
2010 153 6 2 205 
2011 120 2 1 225 
2012 91 4 4 238 
2013 87 3 2 252 
2014 76 2 0 279 
2015 82 0 0 277 
2016 110 0 0 219 






Table 2 Summary Statistics for Targets  
Summary statistics of selected variables for targets during the period 1990—2016. Except for acquisition price, values are for the year prior to 
acquisition.  


























 Mean Mean  Mean Mean  Mean 
 (median) (median)  (median) (median)  (median) 
Acquisition Price  846.00 158.91 687.10*** 153.31 246.55 -93.24*** 321.70 
 (23.00) 5.05 17.95*** (5.32) (735.58) -730.25** (40.11) 
Target Total Assets  5989.20 861.68 5127.52*** 880.48 567.45 313.03*** 304.71 
 (257.70) (133.12) 124.58*** (135.74) (86.29) 49.45** (75.09) 
Target Sales  3213.82 694.51 2519.32*** 708.37 477.55 230.81*** 299.26 
 (195.00) (118.94) 76.06*** (123.42) (94.90) 28.52** (94.88) 
Target SEQ 1449.14 229.31 1219.83*** 226.37 275.31 -48.95*** 111.51 
 (96.84) (47.67) 49.17*** (50.30) (30.91) 19.40** (32.62) 
Target EBITDA 551.92 78.19 473.73*** 78.29 76.51 1.78*** 48.40 
 (22.50) (10.57) 11.93*** (10.81) (8.37) 2.44 (9.14) 
Target EPS 0.74 -0.06 0.80*** -0.08 0.24 -0.31*** 0.56 
 (0.55) (0.20) 0.35*** (0.19) (0.40) -0.21 (0.46) 
Tobin 1.24 1.22 0.02*** 1.25 0.70 0.55*** 0.67 
 (0.76) (0.65) 0.11*** (3.95) (0.51) 3.44** (0.48) 
Target FCF to AT -0.05 -0.12 0.07*** -0.12 0.00 -0.13*** 0.04 
 (0.01) (-0.01) 0.02*** (-0.01) (-0.00) -0.01 (0.02) 
Target Leverage 0.76 0.77 -0.02*** 0.79 0.55 0.24*** 0.81 







  Table 3  Correlation Matrix of variables  
  tranvalue AT SALE SEQ EBITDA EPSPX tobin FCFtoAT 
AT 0.5495*** 
       
SALE 0.1834*** 0.6386*** 
      
SEQ 0.6526*** 0.8262*** 0.5251*** 
     
EBITDA 0.5052*** 0.8953*** 0.6903*** 0.8183*** 
    
EPSPX 0.0510** 0.0923*** 0.0954*** 0.1280*** 0.2124*** 
   
Tobin -0.0059 -0.0410 -0.0309 -0.0278 -0.0361 -0.0026 
  
FCFtoAT 0.0069 0.0122 0.0104 0.0146 0.0143 0.0274 -0.6791*** 
 




  Table 4 Acquisition Premiums 
Acquisition premium is calculated as the transaction value divided by the target market value 
4 weeks before acquisition times percentage of shares acquired. 




Public Acquisitions 1.3267 1.0949 0.9060 0.2241 7.7126 
Private Acquisitions 1.4414 1.0796 1.7611 0.1740 14.9068 
Private Acquisitions with 
Mgmt 
1.3144 1.2827 0.4382 0.1740 3.2131 
Management Buyouts 1.4521 1.4156 0.4304 0.1740 3.2131 
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  Table 5 Estimates of Acquisition Multiples  
This table contains mean (median) of estimates of acquisition multiples for the sample of private 
acquisitions of public targets over the period 1990-2016. The table shows the differences in 
acquisition multiples (Deal Value to Book Value of Equity, Deal Value to Earnings Per Share, 








with mgmt Difference p value 
 Mean Mean   
 (median) (median)   
Deal Value to Book Value of Equity 0.0852 0.8599 0.7748 0.2520 
 (0.1911) (0.4870) 0.2959 0.0967 
Deal Value to Earnings Per Share 17.2502 162.1162 151.8000 0.2863 
 (0.7998) (24.3576) 23.5578 0.0070 
Deal Value to EBITDA 2.0234 -11.5678 -13.5912 0.3403 
 (0.2854) (1.2270) 0.9416 0.0967 
Deal Value to Sales 0.8325 0.4051 -0.4274 0.0339 




Table 6 Announcement Period Returns of Target Firms  
Announcement period returns for a sample of U.S. acquisitions during the period 1990-2016. Cumulative abnormal returns are based on the single-factor market 
model estimated from day –255 to day –46 for each sample firm.  
Event Window Public Acquisitions 
Private Acquisitions Without 


























(-30,-2) 1.45 2.2 0.27 2.08 2.18 1.62 5.51 7 2.12 3.85 4.64 1.45 
(-1, +1) 8.94 8.6 9.47 4.64 4.03 9.05 12.76 12.34 23.1 19.63 17.09 26.99 
(-1, 0) 6.34 6.45 6.18 3.39 2.9 5.64 11.00 10.49 19.61 16.16 14.02 23.24 
(0, +1) 8.52 7.98 9.36 4.23 3.6 8.66 10.26 9.06 22.27 15.21 10.84 26.08 
(+2,+30) 0.42 0.66 0.05 1.39 1.31 1.85 0.25 1.03 -2.19 -0.89 -0.13 -2.73 
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Table 7 Regression of Acquisition Premium on Acquisition, Firm, and Market Characteristics  
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for First regression 
  mgmt Tobin leverage logmv cash toehold tender  
Tobin -0.0339 
      
 
leverage -0.0066 -0.0129 
     
 
logmv -0.0627** 0.1111*** 0.0009 
    
 
cash -0.0711*** 0.0206 -0.0521** -0.0693*** 
   
 
toehold -0.0028 -0.0387 0.0060 -0.0934*** -0.0444* 
  
 
tender 0.0568** 0.0238 0.0111 0.0231 -0.0249 -0.0137 
 
 
Hostile -0.0066 -0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0155 -0.0921*** 0.0070 -0.0041 
          
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for 2nd and 3rd regressions 
  private mgmt  leverage Tobin toehold tender Hostile logmv 
mgmt 0.1968*** 
       
leverage 0.0004 -0.0018 
      
Tobin -0.0078 -0.0297* -0.0026 
     
toehold 0.2099*** 0.0402** -0.0046 -0.0349** 
    
tender -0.2216*** -0.0276* -0.0027 -0.0102 0.0511*** 
   
Hostile -0.0389** -0.0093 -0.0042 0.0098 0.0280* 0.0935*** 
  
logmv -0.3101*** -0.0878** 0.0088 0.1057*** -0.1972*** 0.0704*** 0.0468*** 
 











Table 7  
Panel B Regression of Acquisition Premium on Acquisition, Firm, and 
Market Characteristics 
Ordinary least squares regressions of acquisition premium on acquisition, 
firm, and market characteristics for U.S. acquisitions during 1990—2016. 
For the first regression, the sample includes all private acquisitions. The 
second subsample includes 3719 completed private and public acquisitions 
excluding private acquisitions with management participation. The third 
subsample includes 2489 completed private and public acquisitions 
excluding private acquisitions without management participation. 
The dependent variable is Winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. All 
independent variables are for the year prior to acquisition. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
private 0.161***   
 (0.045)   
mgmt  -0.340* 0.003 
  (0.199) (0.118) 
Tobin -0.016** -0.017 -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
leverage 0.001 0.015 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
toehold -0.229*** -0.069 -0.221*** 
 (0.054) (0.184) (0.053) 
Hostile 0.059 -1.719 0.159 
 (0.298) (1.714) (0.275) 
tender 0.287*** 0.430 0.248*** 
 (0.061) (0.297) (0.056) 
logmv -0.066*** -0.143*** -0.051*** 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.009) 
cash -0.705*** -1.646*** -0.577*** 
 (0.051) (0.177) (0.050) 
Constant 2.862*** 4.691*** 2.577*** 
 (0.144) (0.437) (0.144) 
Observations 3,719 1,388 2,489 
R-squared 0.064 0.079 0.065 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 8 Regressions of cumulative abnormal return on Acquisition, Firm, and Market Characteristics 
This table reports ordinary least squares regression analysis of cumulative abnormal return on acquisition, firm, 
and market characteristics for U.S. acquisitions during 1990—2016. Appendix A contains variable definitions.  
 CAR(-1,1) CAR(-30, -2) CAR(+2,+30) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
mgmt 0.016  0.038  0.010  
 (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.021)  
sox_mgmt 0.111***  -0.046  -0.053  
 (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.038)  
pvnomgmt -0.048***  0.011  0.001  
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006)  
sox_pvnomgmt 0.084***  -0.008  0.004  
 (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.012)  
pvandmgmt  -0.045***  0.012  0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
sox_pvandmgmt  0.091***  -0.011  -0.002 
  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
leverage 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
toehold 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.011 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
tender 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.014* -0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Hostile 0.130*** 0.129*** -0.033 -0.033 0.021 0.021 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039) 
logmv -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
cash -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.061*** -0.061*** 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.199*** 0.200*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
       
Observations 3,406 3,406 3,457 3,457 3,475 3,475 
R-squared 0.134 0.130 0.042 0.041 0.009 0.008 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 9 Regressions of deal status on Acquisition, Firm, and Market 
Characteristics 
This table reports ordinary least squares regression analysis of deal status 
on acquisition, firm, and market characteristics for U.S. acquisitions during 
1990—2016. The dependent variable is deal status, a dummy set equal to 1 
if the deal is completed. All independent variables are for the year prior to 
acquisition. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
mgmt -0.132***   
 (0.023)   
leverage 0.000 -0.000 -0.017* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
Tobin 0.001 -0.000*** -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) 
toehold 0.625*** 0.787*** 0.583*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.058) 
Hostile -0.503*** -0.335*** 0.090 
 (0.047) (0.026) (0.413) 
tender -0.015 0.159*** 0.092 
 (0.033) (0.010) (0.149) 
logmv 0.005* -0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.017) 
cash 0.060*** -0.025*** 0.031 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.068) 
private  0.107***  
  (0.006)  
Number_of_Bidders   -0.184** 
   (0.079) 
Constant 0.237*** 0.154*** 0.407* 
 (0.038) (0.014) (0.214) 
Observations 3,367 21,561 191 
R-squared 0.514 0.589 0.422 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
